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Abstract 
One of the controversies in growth analysis is the relative role 
of capital accumulation and productivity growth in driving output 
growth. As we interpret the evidence, discussed in this paper, part of 
the controversy on the role of capital accumulation in the growth 
process is due to the time span of the analysis (growth transitions 
versus steady states/long run growth). In fact, the empirical importance 
of various growth determinants will depend on what we want explain: 
long run growth, say growth over half a century or a century as 
different from growth dynamics over one or two decades. New 
evidence is showing that growth fluctuations at frequencies of a 
decade or so are very important part of the growth story for many 
developing countries. Growth is an irregular and volatile process in 
which the same country may experience shifts in growth regimes that 
can entail growth take-off and booms, stagnation and/or growth 
collapses. In this context, investment and savings become important 
variables whose determinants and dynamics we want to understand for 
designing public policies affecting positively the rate of economic 
growth.  
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I. Introduction 
One of the most complex and empirically unsettled subjects in 
economics is the explanation of the process of economic growth. As 
the creation of wealth is of critical importance for the welfare of most 
people around the world the current disarray in growth economics is 
not only a topic of analytical interest but also of practical importance. 
One of the controversies in growth analysis is the relative role of 
capital accumulation and productivity growth in driving output 
growth. As we interpret the evidence, discussed in this paper, part of 
the controversy on the role of capital accumulation in the growth 
process is due to the time span of the analysis (growth transitions 
versus steady states/long run growth). In fact, the empirical importance 
of various growth determinants will depend on what we want explain: 
long run growth, say growth over half a century or a century as 
different from growth dynamics over one or two decades. New 
evidence is showing that growth fluctuations at frequencies of a 
decade or so are very important part of the growth story for most 
countries except probably high per capita income economies. Growth 
is an irregular and volatile process in which the same country may 
experience over a period of several decades various shifts in growth 
regimes that can entail growth take-off and booms, stagnation and/or 
growth collapses. The description of steady growth around a well-
defined and stable trend is clearly not a good description of the actual 
growth experience for most economies in the world, certainly not for 
developing countries. In this context, investment and savings become 
important variables whose determinants and dynamics we want to 
understand for affecting positively the rate of economic growth. A 
growth boom can be driven by positive terms of trade shock, the 
discovery of natural resources or the adoption of pro-growth economic 
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policies. To support and consolidate growth beyond a boom phase, investment is a critical vehicle 
to create productive capacities and probably generate knowledge spillovers and new technologies. 
At the same time, ensuring an adequate level of national savings is important as foreign savings can 
be volatile and lead to “sudden stops” that force costly macroeconomic adjustment and eventually 
growth crises.  
The relation between savings and investment involve analytically important and critical 
policy issues of great relevance. First, the discrepancies between intended savings and desired 
investment creates macroeconomic fluctuations and growth cycles in a world of less than perfect 
price and wage flexibility. Second, the causality between savings, investment and growth can run in 
various directions, depending on how the theorist views the working of the economic system at 
macro level. Third, in a world of capital mobility we want to know how close is the relationship 
between domestic savings and domestic investment.  
This paper examines various topics around savings, investment, their determinants and 
relationship between them (particularly in a world of increased international capital mobility) and 
to economic growth. The paper first discusses, briefly, alternative causality lines in the relationship 
between these three variables putting them in the perspective of macroeconomic theory and growth 
economics. In addition, we show how different schools of economic thought “close” the relevant 
economic model. Second, the paper looks at the main determinants of savings and investment from 
a national point of view, highlighting transmission channels and empirical evidence that are more 
relevant for developing countries. Third, the paper reviews recent empirical evidence on the role of 
capital accumulation in accounting for growth both during shifts between different growth regimes 
and in the medium and long run. Fourth, the paper discusses the relationship between domestic 
savings and domestic investment in a world of capital mobility, the so-called Feldstein–Horioka 
“puzzle”. The paper also discusses the evolution of global savings–investment balances in a 
historical perspective starting from the period of the gold standard and the first wave of 
globalization of the second half of the 19th century until First World War, the inter-war period and 
the post 1970s-late twentieth century wave of financial globalization that dominates the 
international economy today. It shows the changing pattern of savings–investment in main 
economies and the role of savings flows to and from developing countries. The paper closes with 
some final remarks on the analytical and empirical results examined in the paper as well as policy 
implications for the savings and investment process from a pro-growth perspective. 
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II. National growth, savings and 
investment: causality issues 
In the Keynesian and post-Keynesian traditions investment 
plays a critical role both as a component of aggregate demand (often 
the most volatile) as well as a vehicle of creation of productive 
capacity on the supply side. In post Keynesian demand-driven models 
investment still plays a crucial role in determining medium run growth 
rates. Most of these models assume unemployment and idle productive 
capacities. A variant but assuming full employment of labor is 
provided by Nicholas Kaldor who postulated growth models with 
changes in functional income distribution as a mechanism of 
macroeconomic adjustment acting through national savings in which 
capitalists have a greater marginal propensity to save than workers.  
In a different vein we have the Austrian school of Von Mises, 
Hayek and others. In this school, the real interest rate (relative to the 
prospective return on physical assets) is the equilibrating variable 
between the supply of loans (savings) and the demand of loans for 
productive purposes (investment). An investment boom is created 
when banks or monetary policy keep the interest rate below the 
“natural rate” (a concept developed by the Swedish economist Knut 
Wicksell), say the interest rate which equilibrates the demand for 
loans (investment) with the supply of funds (savings).  
In the 1950s neoclassical economics gave rise to a celebrated 
long run, supply-driven, growth models such as Solow (1956). In this 
model, the rate of technical change, the savings ratio and the rate of 
population growth are the three parameters that determine the rate of  
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growth of the economy in steady –state. In this model, the investment ratio plays a role only in the 
transition between steady –states (in practice that transition may take a few decades) but not in the 
configuration of the long run growth equilibrium of the economy. We will see that these transitions 
are empirically very relevant; in fact, new papers in growth economics are starting to focus more on 
growth transitons rather than on long run growth. In the Solow model, as said before, there is no 
independent investment function (a concept central to the Keynes of the General Theory). Full 
wage-price flexibility solves any ex-ante discrepancy between intended savings and desired 
investment avoiding the sort of macroeconomic fluctuations that were the concern of Keynes and 
Austrian economists alike. In the “endogenous” growth theory developed since the mid 1980s a 
new role was recreated for investment to affect long run growth by making the rate of technical 
change and productivity growth linked either to the accumulation of physical capital or the 
accumulation of human capital. 
The issue of causality between savings, investment and growth has plagued growth 
economics since the start. The controversy can be cast in terms of two leading theoretical 
perspectives: the “Marx–Schumpeter-Keynes view” versus the “Mill-Marshall-Solow view “(see 
Chakravarty, 1993; and Solimano, 1997). The first view posits that investment (Keynes, and to 
some extent, Marx) and innovation (Schumpeter, Marx) are the two variables that drive output 
growth. In this context, savings adjusts passively to meet the level of investment required to hold 
macroeconomic equilibrium and deliver a certain growth rate of output. In this view growth leads 
savings. In contrast, in the Mill-Marshall-Solow approach that channel of causality is reversed as it 
assumed that all savings is automatically invested and translated into output growth under wage–
price flexibility and full employment. As a result, in the Mill-Marshall-Solow approach savings 
leads economic growth. The two schools deliver alternative lines of causality between savings, 
investment, innovation and growth. These causality issues are still relevant in an open economy 
with capital mobility, as we shall see in a later section. 
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III. The determinants of savings 
The research on savings has identified some key factors 
explaining savings rates such as income (both level and growth rate), 
the degree of macroeconomic stability, foreign borrowing constraints, 
financial and demographic variables and income distribution. We also 
discuss the evidence on the relation between government savings and 
private savings, and government savings and national savings. 
1. Savings and income 
A positive association between national savings and current 
income levels is observed both in time series and cross section data 
(micro and aggregate) as savings (as a proportion of GDP) rises with 
the level of income per capita. The evidence has found a type of 
inverted “U” relation between savings and the level of income per 
capita (Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei, 1998). It has become an 
accepted stylized fact that savings rates rise at the initial stages of 
development (although not at very low per capita income levels) and 
declines as the countries reach higher per capita income and more 
mature development levels (see also Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart, 1995). 
In low-income countries that are closer to subsistence levels we may 
expect that most income be consumed (with little left for savings). 
Higher income levels make it possible to save more; however, the size 
of the effect declines as income raises, in line with a decline of 
investment and growth opportunities, the aging of the population, and 
lower fertility rates these are features that tend to be observed in 
countries that approach higher per capita income levels. 
Savings, investment and growth in the global age: analytical and policy issues 
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Evidence is also extensive on the positive association between savings and growth (see 
Carrrol and Weil, 1994; Edwards, 1996; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 1999). The 
permanent income theory implies that consumption is determined by permanent (long run) income, 
implying that savings follows current (transitory) growth.1 The life-cycle model, first developed by 
Franco Modigliani, argues that productivity growth makes the working young richer than the old, 
and the young will be saving more than the old are dis-saving. Aggregate income growth would 
follow from increasing the lifetime profiles for succeeding generations.2 In turn, habit formation in 
consumption is a factor that helps to rationalize the positive correlation between savings and 
growth. Carroll and Weil (1994) argued that people adjust consumption habits slowly, which makes 
savings positively related with current growth of income.  
2. Foreign credit constraints 
Theory says that one of the purposes of borrowing is to allow people to smooth consumption 
in face of shocks. However, consumption will follow more closely current income at low-income 
because credit constraints are more binding at those income levels. In contrast, consumption is 
expected to follow more closely permanent (or expected income) at higher income levels. Foreign 
credit restrictions are more relevant for low income and financially distressed middle-income 
countries; in those cases we should expect that consumption would adjust more to shocks, as 
smoothing is more difficult. In the context of foreign borrowing constraints, additional foreign 
savings is likely to lead to higher consumption and, ceteris paribus, lower national savings. There is 
evidence about a negative relationship between national and foreign savings, with the offsetting 
effect ranging between 50% and 70% (see Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 1999). 
3. Financial development, domestic credit constraints, and 
interest rates 
The research on financial development has found an ambiguous effect of financial variables 
on national savings. Deeper financial markets and strengthened prudential regulation of financial 
institutions help to enhance saving (and investment) opportunities by offering a wider variety of 
financial instruments to channel savings and also by providing more security (in the case of 
effective regulation) to investors. However, financial development is also often associated with an 
increased availability of credit for consumption relaxing domestic liquidity constraints. Savings can 
be discouraged as more credit becomes available, particularly credit for consumption.3  
The association between interest rates and savings is also ambiguous theoretically (income 
and substitution effects may work in opposite directions). The income effect produced by higher 
interest rates may be positive or negative depending whether the saver is a net wealth holder or a 
net debtor. The (positive) income effect of an increase in interest rates for a net wealth-holder may 
run in opposite direction than the substitution effect that induces a cut in current consumption 
(substituting for future consumption). The empirical evidence on the effects of interest rates on 
savings has proven to be inconclusive (see Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 1999). Some have explored 
the sensitivity of savings to the rate of interest as a function of income levels. Ogaki, Ostry and 
Reinhart (1995) provided evidence showing that savings are more responsive to rates of return at 
higher income levels. As indicated before, at lower income level people cannot smooth 
                                                     
1
  The terms of trade effect is viewed as a transitory deviation of national income from its trend. The Milton Friedman’s consumption 
hypothesis would argue that the additional income resulting from transitory improvements in the countries’ terms of trade would be 
mostly saved. 
2
  In more extensive models of consumer behavior the relationship is theoretically ambiguous (Carroll and Weil, 1994).  
3
  Most likely both effects interact affecting the results of the effects of financial development on savings (Piles and Reinhart, 1999). 
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consumption over time. At higher income levels it is possible to save and dis-save. Thus, according 
to this evidence the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between present and current 
consumption varies with the level of wealth. 
4. Macroeconomic uncertainty 
In the literature an important reason to save is the precautionary motive, as people would 
save more at times of uncertainty to anticipate the possibility of difficult times. One such a source 
of uncertainty is of macroeconomic nature. This can be reflected in high and erratic inflation, 
exchange rate volatility, cycles of boom and contraction, and instability in the financial system. 
One response to these uncertainties is capital flight as people leave domestic assets due to this 
uncertainty (Edwards, 1996; and Taylor, 1996 and 1999).4 
 Inflation has been a factor strongly associated with macroeconomic instability; however, the 
effects of low to moderate inflation on savings is bound to be very different from the impact of 
high or even explosive inflation of the type that destroys the payments and banking systems and 
financial savings along the way. The classic example is the hyperinflation of Germany in 1923 
although there are more recent cases such as Argentina during the hyperinflation of the late 1980s 
and Brazil in the early 1990s. In 2001-2002 Argentina suffered a banking crises following the 
abandonment of the currency board adopted in 1991. In this later banking crisis, people (mainly 
from the middle class) --that believed in the system-- and had deposits in the banks experienced the 
loss of part of their financial savings. 
5. Fiscal policy 
The stance of fiscal policy is expected to affect savings. One channel is the size of the fiscal 
deficit or surpluses that has been found to affect the level of national saving rates. Low fiscal 
deficits or surpluses contribute to national savings, as complete Ricardian equivalence has been 
refuted empirically (i.e. an increase in public savings is not fully offset by a decline in private 
savings). This effect is stronger in developing countries subject to subsistence consumption and 
liquidity constraints (see Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). The evidence confirms the partial 
offset between government and private savings with the offset coefficient in the range 40%-70%. 
This means that 1% of additional government savings (in terms of GDP) adds about 0.5% of GDP 
to national savings. Another channel is the level of taxation on factors that affect savings as interest 
rates, dividends of firms or other variables.  
6. Demographics 
The age structure of population is another determinant of national savings. According to the 
life-cycle hypothesis a larger working population relative to the older population (or young family 
dependents) contributes to raise national savings. The working young are net savers and the retired 
old have often-negative savings. In economies with higher proportions of working populations the 
national savings rates would be higher than in ageing economies with higher shares of old people 
in their populations. Studies using cross-country data have been more successful in confirming the 
negative effect of dependency ratios (say the share of population below 15 and above 65) on 
saving, probably because demographic variables change slowly over time (Masson, Bayoumi and 
                                                     
4
  Precautionary motives may help to explain the positive association between saving and consumption of young consumers (who 
expect positive but uncertain future income growth) and the positive saving of retired people (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 
2000). 
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Samiei, 1998). Some microeconomic studies conflict with the findings at country levels, 
which maybe partly due the aggregation of cohorts of different ages in macro studies. 
Bequests may also contribute to reduce aggregate savings even if the old do not dis-save 
(Carroll and Weil, 1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2000). The literature mostly agrees on a 
negative correlation between age dependency ratios and national savings confirming the 
theory and empirical evidence. 
7. Income distribution and savings 
Richer people are expected to save more as a proportion of their income than poor 
people (savings is, in a way, a superior good). Some formulations make savings depending 
upon functional income distribution (i.e. Nicholas Kaldor who assumed that capitalists have a 
higher propensity to save than workers) whereas others make a link between personal income 
distribution and saving. While for the most part, the empirical literature based on cross-
section micro-data suggest a positive relation between personal income inequality and overall 
personal savings, the evidence on this issue is more mixed at aggregate, country level. 
Empirical studies such as Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1998) (see also Schmidth-Hebbel and 
Seven, 2000) indicate that cross-country data do not reveal a strong association between 
personal income distribution and aggregate saving. The authors show that this relation holds 
for samples of developing and developed countries, and is robust to alternative saving 
measures, income distribution indicators and functional forms.  
New political economy literature emphasizes that regressive income distributions are a 
factor contributing to political instability and through this channel they may depress both 
growth and savings. Lower growth contributes to reduce savings through the growth-savings 
link but also political instability may discourage savings because of the uncertainties about 
saving prospects. 
8. National savings and growth 
Empirically, national savings and growth are positively associated, especially in the 
case of developing countries. The evidence also shows that investment and national savings 
are positively related, reflecting the existence of foreign credit constraints an issue we take up 
later. In terms of causality, the research on the determinants of savings has generally 
considered growth as a determinant of national savings, suggesting that the causality runs 
from growth to national savings (the typical regression is one in which national savings 
relative to GDP is the dependent variable of the regression and GDP growth is a right-hand 
side explanatory variable).5 The evidence on the association between GDP growth and foreign 
savings is mixed: there are episodes of high growth with relatively low levels of foreign 
saving rates (i.e. some East Asian economies) and episodes of low growth episodes and high 
foreign savings (i.e. low income countries in Africa and Latin America that receive sizeable 
levels of foreign aid).6 
The issue of causality between savings and growth is more controversial as discussed 
before. In the neoclassical growth model a la Solow saving is exogenously given. In contrast, 
                                                     
5 
 In the case of the link between investment and growth, growth in most cases is regressed against investment, therefore, implicitly 
assuming that investment causes growth. A mutual reinforcing process between national savings and growth, and investment and 
growth is assumed in the literature (see for example Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu, 2000; Solimano, 2006; Hausmann, Pritchett and 
Rodrik, 2004; Gutiérrez, 2005). 
6 
 See Gutiérrez (2006) for Latin America. 
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in the Keynesian school saving is endogenously determined as a result of the interactions 
between income and consumption. Higher growth generates higher incomes that lead, in turn, 
to higher savings (as the propensity to consume out of income is less than one). Carroll and 
Weil (1994) provided strong evidence that growth causes saving (Granger causality), but 
Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (2000) questioned Carroll and Weil results, showing that the 
causality may go both ways depending on the data (sample and frequency of the data) and the 
econometric technique used to estimate the relationship between both variables. 
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IV. The determinants of investment 
Wicksell, Bohm-Bawerk, Fisher and others developed a capital 
theory in the late 19th century and early 20th century. However, John 
Maynard Keynes in The General Theory (1936) was among the first 
that postulated an independent investment equation in a demand-
driven macro model.7 Keynes emphasized that the determinants of 
savings were of a different nature that the determinants of investment, 
challenging the view of the classics, prevailing at the time, that 
assumed that the real interest rate was the key variable that 
equilibrated savings and investment.  
In Keynes it was disposable income and possibly wealth the 
main determinants of savings whereas investment depended upon the 
difference between the real cost of capital relevant for firms and the 
marginal efficiency of capital (or productivity of capital). Expectations 
were critical in the determination of investment as it was the 
prospective estimate of the future profitability of capital that mattered 
for investment decisions. The investment function experienced several 
refinements and reformulations after Keynes original formulation 
adding other determinants that the practice of macroeconomic 
adjustment, reforms and growth are showing as relevant to better 
understand investment decisions. 
 
 
                                                     
7
  In the early 1930s the Polish economist Michael Kalecki put forward, independently, a somewhat similar formulation to Keynes.  
See Don Patinkin (1982) for a different view in which Keynes and Kalecki formulations of investment are interpreted to be quite 
different in scope. 
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1. Profitability and appropriability 
The return of investment is obviously important in investment decisions but the capacity of 
investors to appropriate those returns is also ultimately very relevant.8 If property rights are weakly 
enforced potentially high returns may not induce higher actual investment as the appropriability or 
internalization of those returns may not take place. The respect of property rights and the capacity 
to internalize returns from investment require a certain level of trust that guide economic 
transactions and also a judiciary system that allow contracts to be draw and respected at a 
reasonable cost. Recently, new attention as been devoted to analyze issues of profitability of 
investment in terms of the “cost of doing business” a concept that involves the cost of obtaining 
permits, licenses and other requisites to set-up a plant and start and maintain business.9 The 
profitability variable, in turn, is affected by factors such as cash flows, corporate income taxes, 
depreciation rules and others fiscal policy variables (see Alesina, Ardagna and Perotti, 2002; 
Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and Solimano, 1996). Political economy variables are also important in the 
determination of investment. In fact, political stability and social peace are also factors that private 
investors—national or foreign – attach great importance. For the return of capital to accrue to 
capitalists (i.e to make them appropriable) the risks of destabilizing policies and/or confiscator 
actions by governments --that have the monopoly of force and law enforcement --- have to be low. 
Also labor–capital relations must be reasonably harmonious or at least no conflictive to ensure 
social peace. In this vein, a social equilibrium characterized by high inequality, political 
polarization, conflictive labor–capital relations tends to lead to policies that are ultimately against 
capital and therefore penalize investment. This may operate through unsustainable polices that try 
to buy social peace in the short run by artificially rising real wages (i.e. through fixing an 
overvalued exchange rate), or through higher taxation. Also downright hostility to private property 
in highly unequal societies may develop with negative consequences for private investment. 
2. Growth cycles and capacity utilization 
As indicated before a stylized fact of the process of economic growth, particularly for 
developing countries, is the high frequency of cycles of growth take-offs, growth collapses and 
stagnation. In other words, past growth is often a poor predictor of future growth for a given 
country.10 The behavior of investment in growth cycles (see later) is important. Investment is 
affected and also affects the type and duration of those cycles in a double causation fashion. The 
literature on investment has emphasized the effects of capacity utilization on investment stressing 
the fact that investment is deterred in an economy with unused productive capacity and possibly 
uncertain expectations by the private sector on the duration and intensity of various stagnationary 
and recessive cycles (Serven and Solimano, 1993). Empirically, the effects of capacity utilization 
variables in empirical investment equations are often very strong and statistically significant but 
caution is required when establishing causality between investment and the degree of unused 
capacity. 
3. Fiscal policy and investment 
The effect of fiscal policy on private investment acts through at least three channels: (a) the 
fiscal deficit in general tends to reduce private investment through its effects on real interest rates 
                                                     
8 
 Rodrik (2006) discusses the role of appropriability in formulating successful growth strategies.  
9 
 See World Bank (2005).  
10
  This fact was brought to attention by Easterly , Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) and confirmed by subsequent empirical work 
on growth.  
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and the absorption of private savings to finance the deficits. It also signals a lack of sustainability 
of fiscal policy that deters private investment; (b) another channel is through the level, composition 
and quality of public investment that complements (or substitutes) private investment (see Schmidt-
Hebbel, Serven and Solimano, 1996), (c) the level of taxation on corporate earnings and 
depreciations rules.  
4. The role of uncertainty and irreversibility 
Another important topic is the effect of uncertainty on private investment. To explain the 
channels through which uncertainty affects investment, research in the last decade or so has 
developed and tested new theories that highlight the role of irreversibility on investment. As 
physical capital once installed in a particular firm or sector cannot be changed or disinvested, 
except at a large cost: in a sense capital, once installed becomes “irreversible” (see Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994). This feature of investment makes it very sensitive to risk and uncertainty. In 
general there is a high “value of waiting” in an uncertain environment, as firms do not wish to get 
stuck with an excessive stock of capital in the event that conditions that affect profitability change. 
In the context of developing countries this is very relevant as economic structures and policies are 
often more volatile and unstable than in advanced countries. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) 
investigated the effect of macroeconomic volatility as measured by the level and variance of 
inflation rates on the marginal profitability of investment using a formulation of irreversibility 
investment constraints (political instability variables were also tried with no significant statistical 
results). The paper also studied the slow response of investment after stabilization in several 
countries suffering from high inflation in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. The long investment 
pause that led to a slow recovery of economic growth, in the aftermath of stabilization has been 
considered as a case of an increased value of waiting after large macro shocks take place.11  
A considerable literature has studied the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on investment 
and growth in developing countries (see Serven and Solimano, 1993; Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and 
Solimano, 1996, among others). In general, topics of interest have been the effects of unanticipated 
currency devaluations, external shocks, debt problems, financial crises, and other shocks on 
investment.  
5. Finance and investment 
The effect of financial constraints and the structure of finance has been another topic of 
research on investment (see Summers, 1981; Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, 1988; Bruinshood, 
2004). In general firms have two sources of finance: external (equity, bank loans, bonds) and 
internal (retained profits, accelerated depreciation). At the margin, the optimal capital structure 
among different sources of finance is the one in which the marginal cost of different types of 
finance (adjusted by risk, taxes and currency denomination) is equal among different sources. The 
problem is that the supply of external financing in developing countries is restricted, particularly 
for small and medium size enterprises. External borrowing may relax internal credit constraints but 
again often mainly for large and well-connected firms that have access to foreign borrowing. 
Retained profits are a main source of investment financing in developing countries giving the 
constraints and imperfections of capital markets. 
                                                     
11
  In the context of market-based economic reforms in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union it was also observed a 
relatively slow initial reaction of private investment. This may reflect the lack of a private sector in the former socialist countries but also 
reflects the effects of uncertainty on the consolidation of largely untried reform packages, again an increased value of waiting at work. 
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6. The composition of investment 
The structure of investment by type of assets matters for economic growth because the 
different types of investment goods have different effects on productivity and growth. Some 
quantitative studies have emphasized the role of machinery and equipment investment in 
augmenting the role of physical capital (and labor) in the growth processes. Since the industrial 
revolution machinery investment has played a key role, directly as a production factor, and also as a 
mean of acquisition and transmission of technological improvements across countries and within 
countries. De Long and Summers (1991 and 1993) found evidence of high social returns from 
investments in machinery, assigning to machinery investment a primary role in boosting 
productivity growth (proxied by per capita GDP growth). They showed that high rates of machinery 
investment accounted for most of Japan’s successful growth experience after World War II. They 
also concluded that fast-growing countries were those with favorable supply conditions for 
machinery investments and that developing countries benefited as much as richer economies from 
the technologies embodied in machinery. Building projects are usually less effective in promoting 
growth because the technologies embodied in constructions structures have lower potential of being 
transmitted across production process. In addition, the output of the construction sector is mostly 
non-tradable and technologically less dynamic. 
There are also potential complementarities between private investment and public investment 
(Kahn and Kumar, 1997; Kahn and Reinhart, 1990; Serven and Solimano, 1993; and Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991), mainly public investment in infrastructure and education.12 The roles played by 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have been addressed by Lim (2001), Borensztein et al. (1998), and 
Olofsdotter (1998) 
                                                     
12
  The roles of infrastructure have been addressed by Easterly and Pack (2001) for Africa and Moguillansky and Bielchowsky (2000) 
for Latin America. 
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V. The empirical role of investment 
in long run growth and in growth 
transitions 
In evaluating the impact of capital accumulation and investment 
on output growth it is useful to draw a distinction between medium-
long run growth processes and growth transitions. In addressing the 
first issue a strand of the literature tends to attach a greater role to total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth than to capital accumulation in 
accounting for output growth. In the words of Easterly and Levine 
(2001) “although physical and human capital accumulation may play 
key roles in igniting and accounting for economic progress in some 
countries, something else—TFP—accounts for the bulk of cross 
country differences in the level and growth of GDP per capita in a 
broad cross section of countries”. The authors find that the 
contribution of capital growth typically explains less than half of 
output growth and that the share of TFP is usually larger for fast 
growing economies.  
The issue of causality is important here and growth accounting 
does not imply causality. Disagreement persists about the role of 
investment in the growth process. Some authors have concluded that 
investment has been the main factor explaining economic growth. In a 
study for East Asia, Young (1994) concluded that investment was the 
main source of growth in the experience of the East Asian economies 
downplaying the importance of TFP growth in the Asian case. Other 
economists have acknowledged the important role played by fixed 
investment but argued  that  productivity  has been  the engine  that 
has marked  the difference  between  fast and slow growth experiences  
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(Blomstrom et al., 1996; Harberger, 1996 and 1998; Gutiérrez, 2005; Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clarke, 1997). Elias (1992) produced evidence showing that total factor productivity explained 
about one-third of GDP growth in Latin America during 1940-85. 
Some studies find that output growth causes, in the Granger sense, investment rather the 
other way around (Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan, 1996). Also as mentioned before in this paper, 
Carroll and Weil (1994) show that causality runs from output growth to savings rather than the 
other way around. Departing from the standard, Barro-type of cross country growth regressions 
methodology, new studies have investigated “growth transitions”, say processes in which the 
growth rate of output changes upwards or downwards, i.e. growth accelerations and/or growth 
collapses or growth crises. These studies are Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004), Jones and 
Olken (2005) and Solimano and Soto (2006). These studies investigate the role of investment and 
capital accumulation in the transition from one growth regime to another. In Hausmann, et. al 
(2004) growth accelerations (say a significant increase in growth rates relative to a decade or so 
before a certain turning-year) that often last near a decade have been accompanied by an increase 
in investment and trade and also come along with real exchange rate depreciations. In general the 
pattern seems to be that growth accelerations are correlated with increases in export, imports and 
investment ratios but do not seem to be driven by pure accelerations in total factor productivity. 
The study by Jones and Olken concludes that changes in the rate of factor accumulation (including, 
of course, capital) explain relatively little of growth reversals specially growth accelerations; in 
contrast, according to these authors reversals are “largely due to shifts in the growth rate of 
productivity”. For these authors the weak role of capital accumulation in growth transitions 
suggests an efficiency story. In fact, Jones and Olken find that growth accelerations are coincident 
with major expansions in international trade (exports and imports) and attach to sector reallocations 
of labor and other factors to higher productivity sectors the accelerations in output growth rates. 
However the authors detect an asymmetry in accelerations and decelerations with a much larger 
change in investment in growth decelerations than in accelerations. Solimano and Soto (2006) 
focused on Latin America growth experiences and cast the analysis in terms of growth cycles and 
sustained growth episodes. The authors find a higher incidence of growth crises (negative growth) 
in the 1981-2003 period than in the 1960-1980 period; in addition, they show that the countries that 
were rapid growers before 1980 (i.e. Brazil and Mexico) are not the same as those that grew faster 
after 1980 (i.e Chile and the Dominican Republic). The study shows a relatively even importance 
between capital accumulation and TFP growth in changes in growth regimes and emphasize that 
the TFP story tends to be of a more long run nature. 
Summing up, the empirical evidence on the role of investment in explaining output growth is 
far from conclusive. Investment plays a greater role in explaining growth transitions (that last 
around a decade or so) than in accounting for medium-term and long run growth paths (that last 
several decades). In turn, the determinants of long run growth seem to be more in line with the 
Solow model (and to some extent the endogenous growth theories) that stress the role of TFP 
growth in driving long term GDP growth and highlight that investment is important in the 
transitions between steady states. 
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VI. National savings and investment 
under international capital 
mobility  
In an era of globalization, another important theme is the 
correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment under 
international capital mobility. In an influential paper Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) argued that in a world with perfect capital mobility 
domestic savers would seek the higher rate of return irrespective of the 
home or foreign origin of the assets to be invested. In turn, attractive 
investment projects would find adequate financing irrespective if the 
funds would come from the pool of national savings or from foreign 
savings. The authors pose that under perfect capital mobility, national 
savings and domestic investment would be largely uncorrelated. 
However, Feldstein and Horioka found empirically that, contrary to 
the predictions of perfect capital mobility theory there was a strong 
correlation (and statistically significant) between domestic savings and 
domestic investment (a high “savings retention coefficient”) when the 
relation was test for cross section data of industrial economies with (5 
years-average) data of the 1960s and 1970s. Other authors that tested 
the relation between national savings and domestic investment using a 
larger sample of countries and longer time periods further investigated 
the results of Feldstein and Horioka. Taylor (1996) reports those 
results of various studies included his own that basically find a close 
correlation between national savings and national investment, a 
finding that is relatively robust across space and time although it 
varies in periods of higher capital mobility (i.e. during the gold 
standard and since the 1970s, a second period of financial globalization) 
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The high correlation of national investments and domestic savings demonstrates that the financial 
markets are not more integrated today than at the beginning of the 20th century, although a change 
occurred between the two periods in the composition of capital flows, especially an increase of the 
short-term capital flows relatively to long-term capital flows (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; Taylor, 
1996). In any case, the results of the Feldstein and Horioka tests reported by Taylor (1996) suggest 
the existence of “home biases” in terms of the allocation of savings towards national assets and 
towards national investment projects. More recent work by Bordo and Flandreau (2003) finds that 
the degree of financial integration is high in developed economies and has increased since the mid 
1980s (a lowering in the savings retention coefficient). This trend, according to the authors, is not 
observed by developing countries. 
Let us now briefly review some historical evidence pertaining to this topic. One feature is 
that countries change their position of net exporter (or net importer) of capital over time.13 From the 
19th century until the 1980s the United States was, on average a net exporter of capital. After World 
War I, British financial hegemony was replaced by the United States as the main capital exporter of 
the world economy. The U.S. role as a net capital exporter lasted until the early 1980s when it 
started to run current account deficits, importing savings from the rest of the world to finance a 
level of expenditure above its real output14 financing the gap with savings from the rest of the 
world, mainly from positive net savings economies in Asia and also from international reserves 
held by Central Banks in developing countries held mostly in U.S. securities. In addition, the U.S. 
became a net debtor as its foreign liabilities exceed its net foreign assets. Interestingly, under 
current conditions, there is a transfer of savings from developing countries (and from “emerging 
economies”) to the richest economy in the world that spends more than its income generated by 
nationally owned factors of production. Thus, national savings are diverted from the financing of 
growth at home to finance consumption and investment in the richest country of the world. In the 
19th century and up to World War I, a period known as the first wave of globalization, the most 
important flow of capital occurred from Great Britain to a group of countries known as the “New 
World Countries” (Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). London 
constituted the financial center of the global capital market and was called the “banker of the 
world”. It is estimated that the surplus of domestic savings over investment in the U.K was around 
50 percent in the first decade of the 20th century (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). The British pound 
was the dominant currency in the context of the international gold standard. The United Kingdom 
contributed to a peak average of 80 percent of total global foreign investment.15  
In the early 20th century capital flows were characterized by the accumulation of enormous 
one-way positions and a great portfolio diversification by the principal creditor countries, in 
particular Great Britain, and inversely little diversification and high foreign capital “dependence” 
by the debtor New World countries.16 It is interesting to note that capital flew to rich and labor-
scarce New World countries instead of going to poor and labor-abundant Asian and African 
countries, where it could, in principle, have been more profitable given the abundance of cheap 
                                                     
13
  This analysis draws from Solimano and Watts (2005). See also Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for the review of capital flows during 
1880-1913. 
14
  In the 1980s and up to 1993 and after 2000, U.S. public sector deficits contributed significantly to create the current account 
deficits.  
15
  Between 1907 and 1913, Britain’s foreign assets were estimated at £1,127 million, from which 61 percent or £689 million went to 
Canada, Australasia, Argentina and the United States. This percentage rises to 76% or £857 million if we add the other countries of 
Latin America. (see Taylor and Williamson, 1994; Taylor, 1999).  
16
  For example, foreigners held one-fifth of the capital stock of Australia and owned almost half of the capital stock of Argentina. Even 
the United States presented high levels of foreign capital dependence at the end of the 19th century, in spite of its increasing 
domestic savings and investments since the 1830s (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2000, p.209). Thus, gross assets during this period 
were almost equal to net assets. Also, investments took the form of long-term finance to less developed countries, what Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2004) called “development finance”. For example, in 1900, one third of global assets went to countries in Latin America 
and, to a lesser extent, Asia and Africa. 
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labor. This is the so-called “Lucas Paradox”.17 In today’s global capital markets in which capital 
flows and foreign investment aim for risk sharing and diversification instead of long-term financing 
to build infrastructure and housing as was the case in the pre 1914 world. Regarding the direction 
of international capital flows we face also the “Lucas Paradox” in which there is too little capital 
flows to capital-scarce, poor countries. We may think in various factors why capital does not go to 
low income countries: the lack of educated and properly trained work force in poor countries, lack 
of enforceable property rights, bureaucracy, political instability, weak institutions, small domestic 
markets and other factors. The literature of growth under increasing returns suggests that capital, 
skilled labor, superior institutions tend to go together and concentrate in a certain group of 
countries (Easterly, 2001) in which they find favorable conditions for international investment. 
Another difference between the first wave of globalization and contemporaneous financial 
globalization is the importance of capital flows as proportion of savings and investment in both 
source and receiving countries. Although financial globalization since the 1970s and 1980s has 
expanded very rapidly in relative terms it is lower than in the pre-1914 world. In fact, Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2004) report that in 1900-1913 overseas investment represented about one half of domestic 
savings of the U.K. (and one-third, on average, between 1870 and 1914). In other capital exporter 
countries such as Germany, overseas investment represented about 10 percent of national savings 
in 1910-1913. In turn, as said before, around 50 percent of the capital stock of Argentina in 1914 
was in hands of foreigners (in Canada and Australia that percentage was in the range 20-30 
percent). These numbers are lower in the new wave of globalization. After 1970 the ratio of net 
capital outflows over savings in the capital exporting countries never exceeded 5 percent (this is 
influenced by the large current account deficits of the United States). In turn, capital inflows, on 
average, in the same period never exceeded 15 percent of investment in capital importing countries 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). 
In 2005 the current account deficit of the U.S. is about 6 percent of its Gross Domestic 
Product or near 600 billion U.S. dollars. In contrast, countries such as Japan, China, Korea are 
running large current account surpluses in these years contributing to finance the savings short-fall 
of the United States. 
 
                                                     
17
  Indeed, the labor-scarce New World countries, where only a tenth of the world’s population lived, received two-thirds of the British 
capital in 1913-14, while labor-abundant Asia and Africa, accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population, only received a 
quarter of European foreign investment (Clemens and Williamson, 2000). 
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VII. Final remarks and policy 
implications 
Recent literature on economic growth emphasizes the role of 
productivity growth in determining output growth thereby 
downplaying the contribution of factor accumulation in this process. 
In this paper we argue that the role of investment (and factor 
accumulation in general) is different if the focus is on growth 
transitions rather than long run growth. Now, the empirical relevance 
of growth transitions is highlighted by the fact that the growth process 
is more a shift between different growth regimes over time rather than 
steady-growth around a stable trend. Growth is characterized by 
volatility and low correlation between current and past growth rates 
(low time persistence), particularly in developing countries and 
transition economies. In this context, the role of investment in these 
growth transitions is bound to be important. The efficiency story of 
productivity growth is more appropriate to explain long run growth 
within countries and in explaining cross-country differences in growth 
performance. Still, a reform process can trigger short-term 
productivity gains leading to faster growth initially if economies start 
from very distorted levels.  
This paper reviews the various determinants of savings such as 
income, wealth, age structure of the population, credit constraints, 
macroeconomic volatility and inequality of income and wealth. On the 
investment side, we underline the role of profitability and 
appropriability of investment returns and stress the influence of 
property rights, the cost of doing business, political stability, 
inequality  and  quality of capital-labor relations as background factors 
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that affect the appropiability of the return on capital investment. Other factors that also affect 
investment are macroeconomic uncertainty and volatility, fiscal policy, anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in policy regimes and credit constraints. Another topic analyzed in the paper 
is the extent to which increased capital mobility affect the correlation between domestic savings 
and domestic investment. Empirical studies show that in spite of growing financial integration there 
is still a high and significant correlation between national savings and domestic investment both in 
time series national data as well as in cross country data, contrary to the predictions of perfect 
capital mobility theory. The evidence confirms the existence of home biases in the savings-
investment process.  
In general, it is apparent that the benefits of international financial intermediation go more to 
advanced, financially mature, economies rather than countries with limited access to private capital 
financing. Financial integration in a context of speculative and pro-cyclical capital flows can 
induce macroeconomic volatility and financial crises disrupting orderly investment processes. 
Finally, current global economic imbalances in which rich economies have become net capital 
importers affect the global allocation of savings and therefore the financing of investment needed 
for growth in developing countries. Several emerging economies and developing countries have 
become exporters of capital to developed countries (particularly to the United States). The 
consequences for global growth of these new patterns of allocation of savings across countries 
remain to be seen.   
From a policy perspective it is important to identify the factors that: (a) accelerate economic 
growth, (b) maintain a growth momentum once it is reached and (c) help to avoid traumatic stops of 
growth (i.e. such as growth collapses or growth crises). A main mechanism for igniting growth and 
possibly generate new knowledge and productivity growth is investment. But investment is still an 
“intermediate variable” that will be activated if new opportunities are open either by policy 
reforms, by growing international integration or by the discovery of valuable natural resources. In 
turn, factors that can boost investment refer to profitability, adequate property rights, and 
reasonable cost of capital, predictable policy environments, absence of acute social conflict and 
others. In the sequence after a growth momentum is set in motion it is important to ensure macro 
stability and the absence of macro imbalances whose sharp correction often derail ongoing growth. 
In addition, investment has to be financed some way or the other and therefore savings enter into 
the picture. Assuring an adequate level of national savings is critical as an excessive reliance on 
foreign capital can be a risky course of action in a world of imperfect international capital markets 
and often-volatile capital flows. Public savings can be a mechanism to spur national savings given 
the empirical evidence showing that an increase in public savings is less than fully offset by a 
decline in private savings. This analysis illustrates that two critical variables through which public 
polices can affect growth is savings and investment. The trick is to mobilize the adequate policy 
instruments that will affect, in a desired direction, these variables during the different phases of the 
growth process. 
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